以下是今天勤加緣 (2366) 既所有成交記錄:
跟昨天的情況有別, 今天勤加緣係大市下跌180點既情況下表現硬淨. 觀察盤路所見, 今天有幾樣野值得注意:
1. 全日近50萬股成交股數當中, 全部都係以ask價成交, 好少見, 起碼我跟左呢間公司9個月都好似未見過
2. 今日最後果3單成交, 每口成交都係 exactly 沽家所沽的數量, 有5萬4就掃5萬4, 有4萬就要4萬, 有9萬6就9萬6啦. 小戶如我等, 相信都係睇住自己個荷包做人, 睇銀彈做人, 夠錢買1萬股就1萬股, 3萬2千股就3萬2千股, 邊有話有幾多貨就掃幾多貨先得架.
3. 仲有就係, 你同我都唔會係最後果1分鐘做到野 - 偏偏今日15:59分就做左19萬股, 佔全日總成交40%咁滯. 係乜野類型既投資者做既? hm....... 我就無本事係最後一分鐘可以叫經紀做到, e-trading 都無把握可以"禁"到哂. 我係度諗, 一個大老細, 一個專人經紀 --- 咁米一通電話攪掂攞.
開車既日子愈黎愈近了.
(今次既情況愈睇愈跟904中國綠色食品既盤路相似, 可 refer to "邊個傻" posts)
Wednesday, September 06, 2006
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
十分鐘可以做乜?
勤加緣今日收市都係2.30, 翻查記錄, 由8月1日開始至今天26個trading days, 最高位2.33, 最低位2.21, 波幅超窄. 至於今日觀察所得, 全日成交漸轉旺盛, 有99.8萬股成交, 但係奇就奇在這其中有50.4萬股係向臨收市前果十分鐘成既, 要有突然間咁"多"(in relative terms, versus the 1 million total daily)成交而價位無上落, 當然係買賣雙方勢均力敵, 未分勝負, 其中買方代表為 "Man Hon Yeung & Co.", 賣方為 "UOB Kay Hian" - 論名氣, 當然係 UOB Kay Hian好d, 但係MHY那方也未能小看, 不停在2.30掛出買盤, 一被UOB Kay Hian 質左之後, 又係10-20秒後再掛出2.30買盤, 而UOB掛出既沽盤亦不少, 每每十萬八萬股, 不過都係係好短既時間內被掃走, 結果就係最後果十分鐘裡面, 來來回回以bid價, ask價 trade左十口八口都係2.30收市.
再查記錄, UOB Kay Hian曾經做過勤加緣配股既agent, 會唔會有機構投資者經UOB接左貨之後, 而家出貨呢? 又 - UOB Kay Hian 最新近對勤加緣既評為"持有", 目標價係3元 (as of June 2). 如此"口不對心"???? 定還是另有內情?
再睇買家行列, 當中另一"常客"係 "Luen Fat Securities" --- 又係另一間曾經為勤加緣做配股 agent!!!! 另一擁dun叫 Toyo Securities,日本仔也. 不過, 都係果句, 無跌穿止蝕位2.10, 又無乜野fundamentals 改變, 繼續持有, 等待收成也. 10.5倍2006 estimated P/E, 2006-2008 EPS估計複合增長26% (according to Credit Lyonnais), PEG 0.40, 抵買也.
再查記錄, UOB Kay Hian曾經做過勤加緣配股既agent, 會唔會有機構投資者經UOB接左貨之後, 而家出貨呢? 又 - UOB Kay Hian 最新近對勤加緣既評為"持有", 目標價係3元 (as of June 2). 如此"口不對心"???? 定還是另有內情?
再睇買家行列, 當中另一"常客"係 "Luen Fat Securities" --- 又係另一間曾經為勤加緣做配股 agent!!!! 另一擁dun叫 Toyo Securities,日本仔也. 不過, 都係果句, 無跌穿止蝕位2.10, 又無乜野fundamentals 改變, 繼續持有, 等待收成也. 10.5倍2006 estimated P/E, 2006-2008 EPS估計複合增長26% (according to Credit Lyonnais), PEG 0.40, 抵買也.
Monday, September 04, 2006
QJY - profit per episode
In fact, the profitability of QJY media services depends largely on the number of hours of TV program it can produce for TV channels in China, mainly CCTV at the moment. According to data from the past, the following provides a general idea on the profit level per hour of TV production.
2004 fiscal year:
No. of hours of TV program: 58
Net profits: HKD50.36 million
Per production hour profit: HKD868,276
2005 fiscal year:
No. of hours of TV program: 126
Net profits: HKD66.25 million
Per production hour profit: HKD525,794
2006 first half:
No. of hours of TV program: 65
Net profits: HKD43.30 million
Per production hour profit: HKD666,154
According to their CEO in August 2006, the total production hours for 2006 fiscal year would be 180 hours. Let us assume that the per production hour profit drops to HKD500,000 in the second half, a simple estimate would rate 2006's full year profit at HKD100.80 million, an equivalent of HKD0.1986, projecting a dividend payout of 20%, total dividend for the year would be 0.03972, roughly HKD4 cents.
If this simple estimate of HKD0.1986 makes any sense to you, then, the projected 2006 P/E would be 2.30 / 0.1986 = 11.58 times. Projected dividend yield would be 1.74% for 2006.
Yes, there's a question of whether the total number of TV production hours has a 1-to-1 direct relationship with its bottomline figures. But, let's put it till later to go into the rationale behind and for now, some more projected production hours figures for 2007 and 2008 going forward.
Target production hours for FY2007 and FY2008 would be 250 and 375 respectively, according to Anita Leung lately, with a final target of taking up 10% market share of the 5000-hour overall market demand for prime-time TV episodes.
Then, applying the same logic for 2007 and 2008, then, the net profits, EPS and projected P/E would be:
FY2007
Net profits = 250 x 500,000 = HKD125 million
EPS = HKD0.2463
DPS = HKD4.926 cents
Forward P/E = 9.33 times
FY2008
Net profits = 375 x 500,000 = HKD187.5 million
EPS = HKD0.3694
DPS = HKD7.38 cents
Forward P/E = 6.22 times!
Sounds nice. What about the rationale for the basic assumptions behind these calculations?
2004 fiscal year:
No. of hours of TV program: 58
Net profits: HKD50.36 million
Per production hour profit: HKD868,276
2005 fiscal year:
No. of hours of TV program: 126
Net profits: HKD66.25 million
Per production hour profit: HKD525,794
2006 first half:
No. of hours of TV program: 65
Net profits: HKD43.30 million
Per production hour profit: HKD666,154
According to their CEO in August 2006, the total production hours for 2006 fiscal year would be 180 hours. Let us assume that the per production hour profit drops to HKD500,000 in the second half, a simple estimate would rate 2006's full year profit at HKD100.80 million, an equivalent of HKD0.1986, projecting a dividend payout of 20%, total dividend for the year would be 0.03972, roughly HKD4 cents.
If this simple estimate of HKD0.1986 makes any sense to you, then, the projected 2006 P/E would be 2.30 / 0.1986 = 11.58 times. Projected dividend yield would be 1.74% for 2006.
Yes, there's a question of whether the total number of TV production hours has a 1-to-1 direct relationship with its bottomline figures. But, let's put it till later to go into the rationale behind and for now, some more projected production hours figures for 2007 and 2008 going forward.
Target production hours for FY2007 and FY2008 would be 250 and 375 respectively, according to Anita Leung lately, with a final target of taking up 10% market share of the 5000-hour overall market demand for prime-time TV episodes.
Then, applying the same logic for 2007 and 2008, then, the net profits, EPS and projected P/E would be:
FY2007
Net profits = 250 x 500,000 = HKD125 million
EPS = HKD0.2463
DPS = HKD4.926 cents
Forward P/E = 9.33 times
FY2008
Net profits = 375 x 500,000 = HKD187.5 million
EPS = HKD0.3694
DPS = HKD7.38 cents
Forward P/E = 6.22 times!
Sounds nice. What about the rationale for the basic assumptions behind these calculations?
Friday, September 01, 2006
QJY – dividend and issue of new shares
The following dividends were announced by QJY during its years since listed:
2004: HKD2.9 cents (final – listed in June 2004, no interim), 18.7% payout ratio
2005: HKD1.5 cents (interim), HKD1.7 cents (final), 19.7% payout ratio
2006: HKD1.8 cents (interim), 19.5% payout ratio
On several occasions, the CEO indicated expressly that the group’s dividend payout would be targeted at 20% each year and according to past dividend announcements, the shareholders got their dividend payout duly. It is fair to assume that this 20% payout policy will be maintained in the near future. Total cash paid out as dividend after being listed is roughly HKD25.6 million.
Issue of new shares could be a negative factor to its EPS these years. At IPO, 100 million shares were issued to the public at HKD1.28 each. In 2005, 70 million shares were issued at HKD1.83 each and in 2006, 47 million shares were issued at HKD2.28 each. Total capital inflow into the company after IPO from these 2 additional new capital exercises is roughly HKD235 million (70 x 1.83 + 47 x 2.28). It is a comparatively LARGE figure when you look at its IPO proceeds of HKD128 million in 2004.
After the issuance of new shares, the total number of outstanding shares is 507.6 million as of July 31, 2006. This explains the lower growth rate in EPS versus bottom line figures during these years – annual net profit grew 71.6% from FY2004 to H1/2006 while EPS only jumped 18.7% at the same time.
2004: HKD2.9 cents (final – listed in June 2004, no interim), 18.7% payout ratio
2005: HKD1.5 cents (interim), HKD1.7 cents (final), 19.7% payout ratio
2006: HKD1.8 cents (interim), 19.5% payout ratio
On several occasions, the CEO indicated expressly that the group’s dividend payout would be targeted at 20% each year and according to past dividend announcements, the shareholders got their dividend payout duly. It is fair to assume that this 20% payout policy will be maintained in the near future. Total cash paid out as dividend after being listed is roughly HKD25.6 million.
Issue of new shares could be a negative factor to its EPS these years. At IPO, 100 million shares were issued to the public at HKD1.28 each. In 2005, 70 million shares were issued at HKD1.83 each and in 2006, 47 million shares were issued at HKD2.28 each. Total capital inflow into the company after IPO from these 2 additional new capital exercises is roughly HKD235 million (70 x 1.83 + 47 x 2.28). It is a comparatively LARGE figure when you look at its IPO proceeds of HKD128 million in 2004.
After the issuance of new shares, the total number of outstanding shares is 507.6 million as of July 31, 2006. This explains the lower growth rate in EPS versus bottom line figures during these years – annual net profit grew 71.6% from FY2004 to H1/2006 while EPS only jumped 18.7% at the same time.
QJY - profit margins
Since QJY was listed in 2004, the gross profit margin remained at an extremely high level of 80% or above, respectively at 80.7%, 82.7% and 86.4% for FY04, FY05 and H1/06. Net margin also remained at a relatively high level of 58.9%, 62.3% and 68.1% respectively for FY04, FY05 and H1/06.
The reason behind these dreamingly high gross margins could be the unique business model that QJY adopted. QJY is basically a middleman between the TV program series investor, production houses, TV program trading companies and corporations and from its services provided to these parties, it derives either fees income or distribution rights for future benefits.
Most of QJY’s revenue comes from its TV program related services and it’s fair to assume that it’s also where most of its profits come from. QJY would search for potential investors (mainly advertising agencies) and match them with the production houses which would be the one to shoot the film/TV series. In the first half of 2006, QJY finished 60 hours of production and according to its CEO, Dr. Anita Leung in recent announcements, the total production for FY2006 would be 180 hours, implying that the second half of 2006 could provide a higher profit figure than H1.
QJY - turnover
Qin Jia Yuan Media Services (2366.hk) was listed on the mainboard in June 2004 and as of Aug 31, 2006, it has a market value of roughly HKD1,172 million, implying a historic P/E of 17.7 times (net income for FY ending Sep/2005 of HKD66.2 million).
Interim results for the 6 months ended Mar/2006 was HKD43.27 million versus HKD28.82 million during the same period last year, representing a 50.14% increase in net profits. Earnings per share recorded a 27.74% increase, from HKD7.21 cents to HKD9.21 cents, due to a dilution effect from new issue of shares. A preliminary simple estimate of a full year (FY06) net profit of HKD86.54 million, assuming a stable second half, QJY is currently trading at P/E of 13.5.
Taking into consideration of any seasonal factor, the following table compares H1/06 to H1/05’s results.
Turnover (in HKD thousand)
TV program related income 36169 (+33.9%) versus 27010
Marketing related income 18220 (+61.4%) versus 11289
PR service income 9095 (-35.2%) versus 14045
Total 63484 (+21.3%) 52344
TV program related income made up 57% (vs 51%), marketing related income 29% (vs 22%) and PR service accounted for 14% (vs 27%) of its total revenue respectively. Both TV program and marketing income recorded a satisfactory growth during the period; nevertheless, PR income dropped 35%. Overall turnover rose 21% versus a year earlier.
Interim results for the 6 months ended Mar/2006 was HKD43.27 million versus HKD28.82 million during the same period last year, representing a 50.14% increase in net profits. Earnings per share recorded a 27.74% increase, from HKD7.21 cents to HKD9.21 cents, due to a dilution effect from new issue of shares. A preliminary simple estimate of a full year (FY06) net profit of HKD86.54 million, assuming a stable second half, QJY is currently trading at P/E of 13.5.
Taking into consideration of any seasonal factor, the following table compares H1/06 to H1/05’s results.
Turnover (in HKD thousand)
TV program related income 36169 (+33.9%) versus 27010
Marketing related income 18220 (+61.4%) versus 11289
PR service income 9095 (-35.2%) versus 14045
Total 63484 (+21.3%) 52344
TV program related income made up 57% (vs 51%), marketing related income 29% (vs 22%) and PR service accounted for 14% (vs 27%) of its total revenue respectively. Both TV program and marketing income recorded a satisfactory growth during the period; nevertheless, PR income dropped 35%. Overall turnover rose 21% versus a year earlier.
Thursday, August 31, 2006
舊舖搬新舖, 貨倉清單一覽
從舊舖搬到新舖這裏, 本來打算將以前寫落d post都一五一十咁搬哂過黎, 不過諗諗下, 無乜意思, 因為個模擬一百萬元倉既所有進出記錄都係哂果邊, 搬過黎既時候, 呢邊d日期會全部變哂今日, 咁就無意思啦, d 價都做唔到 reference, 不如擺個link係呢度, 等朋友仔可以睇番以前既posts米仲好.
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/money-tree
update 番個百萬倉係搬舖呢一刻既最新狀況:
投入資金: HKD1,000,000
開倉日期: 2006年1月17日
當日恒指: 15,576
HSBC(0005.hk): HKD130
2006年8月30日持倉:
現金 HKD27,300
交銀(3328) 90000股@4.91 HKD441,900 (stop-loss at 4.3)
勤加緣(2366) 250000股@2.32 HKD580,000 (stop-loss at 2.1)
總值 HKD1,049,200 (+4.92%)
同期恒指表現 17284 (+10.97%)
HSBC(5) 140.6 (8.15%)
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/money-tree
update 番個百萬倉係搬舖呢一刻既最新狀況:
投入資金: HKD1,000,000
開倉日期: 2006年1月17日
當日恒指: 15,576
HSBC(0005.hk): HKD130
2006年8月30日持倉:
現金 HKD27,300
交銀(3328) 90000股@4.91 HKD441,900 (stop-loss at 4.3)
勤加緣(2366) 250000股@2.32 HKD580,000 (stop-loss at 2.1)
總值 HKD1,049,200 (+4.92%)
同期恒指表現 17284 (+10.97%)
HSBC(5) 140.6 (8.15%)
Wednesday, January 04, 2006
邊個傻?
中國緑色食品(904), 一間市值HKD15.6億的民營企業, 主要在中國內地種植蔬菜及其它農產品出口到日本市場, 2005年財政年度這方面銷售額達到人民幣2.2億, 佔總銷售額49%, 日本人一向注重食品質量, 從2003年來的已知數據顯示, 日本方面的營銷相當穩定, 維持在2億左右, 顯示公司產品質量穩定, 能維持日本客戶的信心, 但做生意最緊要講前景, 講增長, 股票係有前無後的遊戲, 公司近年開始打開本土內銷市場, 2005年內地銷售額達1.86億元, 年增長50%! 本業發展not bad, 再來看風勢, 2006年開始的 “十一.五”計劃, 鼓勵國內本土消費, 減少對出口過份依賴, 再加上扶助農業政策, 減税等措施, 順風. 最後看股票在誰人手中.
Value partners 近期減持貨量, 沽出約2百多萬股, 持股量跌至7.99%, 但同時間股價在05年12月內上升7.5%至2.15, 創出至上市以來收市新高, 著名基金減貨, 理論上應是壞消息, 何解股價仍上升甚至創出新高? 莫非主席那 “象徵式”的數萬股增持比金手指減持二百萬股更具意思? 應跌不跌, 此乃迷團一.
觀看今天盤路情況, 發現迷團二, 全日成交49.5萬股的中國緑色食品, 成交價位只在2.15-2.175兩個位之中, 買家掛單中人丁單薄, 但價位就是跌不下去, 沽家名單中卻竟然發現大摩的踪影, 於2.275喊沽, 30萬股, 大摩沒理由不知道要一口沽淸30萬股的難度, 而2.275更是未挑戰過的高位, 在那裏掛沽, 好像沒什意思, 而且在2.225-2.25之間也發現摩踪, 難道大摩在等運到? 等有人狂掃幾個價位, 一下子把他要出的貨全吃下去? 從來只有大戶吃人, 好像沒聽過大戶坐在那裏等出貨. 大摩出現的目的很可能就是要你知道他出現, 他在那裏, 讓你望而生畏, 不敢亂來, 然後他慢慢收貨….. 中國緑色食品一月內將公布中期業績, 玄機可能就在那裏, 迷團答案也可能埋在業績下.
可能大摩傻, 癡癡地等其他人來以2.275元吃下他的貨(30萬股或更多??) 可能我傻, 以為大摩是何等人, 其實他也只是在等沽而已, 可能大摩扮傻, 欺騙我等小股民的貨, 收貨為實, 可能以為大摩傻的人更傻, 把手上的貨沽出, 落到大摩的另一隻手中.
傻人見得多, 傻摩未見過, 我決定都係揸實手上d貨唔放過.
Value partners 近期減持貨量, 沽出約2百多萬股, 持股量跌至7.99%, 但同時間股價在05年12月內上升7.5%至2.15, 創出至上市以來收市新高, 著名基金減貨, 理論上應是壞消息, 何解股價仍上升甚至創出新高? 莫非主席那 “象徵式”的數萬股增持比金手指減持二百萬股更具意思? 應跌不跌, 此乃迷團一.
觀看今天盤路情況, 發現迷團二, 全日成交49.5萬股的中國緑色食品, 成交價位只在2.15-2.175兩個位之中, 買家掛單中人丁單薄, 但價位就是跌不下去, 沽家名單中卻竟然發現大摩的踪影, 於2.275喊沽, 30萬股, 大摩沒理由不知道要一口沽淸30萬股的難度, 而2.275更是未挑戰過的高位, 在那裏掛沽, 好像沒什意思, 而且在2.225-2.25之間也發現摩踪, 難道大摩在等運到? 等有人狂掃幾個價位, 一下子把他要出的貨全吃下去? 從來只有大戶吃人, 好像沒聽過大戶坐在那裏等出貨. 大摩出現的目的很可能就是要你知道他出現, 他在那裏, 讓你望而生畏, 不敢亂來, 然後他慢慢收貨….. 中國緑色食品一月內將公布中期業績, 玄機可能就在那裏, 迷團答案也可能埋在業績下.
可能大摩傻, 癡癡地等其他人來以2.275元吃下他的貨(30萬股或更多??) 可能我傻, 以為大摩是何等人, 其實他也只是在等沽而已, 可能大摩扮傻, 欺騙我等小股民的貨, 收貨為實, 可能以為大摩傻的人更傻, 把手上的貨沽出, 落到大摩的另一隻手中.
傻人見得多, 傻摩未見過, 我決定都係揸實手上d貨唔放過.
Tuesday, January 03, 2006
God is here.
想不到2006年第一個港股交易天就出現了一個"神跡".
去年8 月12日提到Sir Templeton的"God only helps those who help others"論, 今天來作個檢討. 當天談到的那隻股票於8月中至12月30日上升了15.7%, 同期恒指回落3.7%, 一來一回當天上千群眾在喊沽的股票outperformed大市19.4%, 上帝已伸出援手, 信者得救了. 而且2006年第一個交易天更挑戰上市以來新高......
當然, 是否能把這15.7%放進口袋裡, 還得看你的信念有多堅穩, 不竟在這四個多月當中, 這信念也曾經為你帶來過8.3%帳面損失, 能否捱過便要睇你自己.
2006年希望自己 - 多點信, 少點浮.
去年8 月12日提到Sir Templeton的"God only helps those who help others"論, 今天來作個檢討. 當天談到的那隻股票於8月中至12月30日上升了15.7%, 同期恒指回落3.7%, 一來一回當天上千群眾在喊沽的股票outperformed大市19.4%, 上帝已伸出援手, 信者得救了. 而且2006年第一個交易天更挑戰上市以來新高......
當然, 是否能把這15.7%放進口袋裡, 還得看你的信念有多堅穩, 不竟在這四個多月當中, 這信念也曾經為你帶來過8.3%帳面損失, 能否捱過便要睇你自己.
2006年希望自己 - 多點信, 少點浮.
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